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Dwing the past half centwy many nations have adopted policies whose function is to
discourage cartels and other restrictive practices. Industrialized nations led the movement
toward pro-competition policies, but more recently, developing nations have begun to
join the parade. Initial steps have also been taken toward the implementation of
competition policies spanning national borders, and proposals for their extension have
been made. This paper analyzes the consequences national and international competition
policies would have for developing nations. Topics covered include the dependence of
LDCs on cartelized commodity exports, the terms on which intermediate goods and
technology are imported by LDCs, access to the markets of industrialized nations, the
consequences ofsubstituting predatory pricing standards for the criteria traditionally used
to combat dumping in international trade, and the links between domestic and
international market structure and the absorption ofadvanced technology.
. -
* Paper to be presented at the East-West Center Conference on International Trade Policy, Maui,
Hawaii, USA, August 8,1996.1 Introduction
In 1995 the Treaty of Marrakech brought an expanded assortment of international
trade and investment practices within a framework of widely accepted rules and
dispute resolution mechanisms. Such an important accomplishment engenders two
new and partially conflicting agenda items -- implementing what has already been
achieved, and addressing important problems left unresolved. Among the matters left
unresolved in the Uruguay Round were the interactions between international trade
with labor standards, protection of the environment, and national competition
policies. This paper addresses the question of competition policy, that is, norms
delineating the extent to which business enterprises may depart from essentially
competitive structure and conduct in their quest for monopoly advantage.
The literature on competition policies, national and inter-national, is vast. A
relatively neglected topic, however, is the exploration ofhow multilateral competition
policy rules might affect the economic prospects ofless-developed countries. Acting
on the physical principle that nature abhors a vacuum ana the behavioral principle that
fools rush in where angels fear to tread, I focus in this paper on the challenges that
would have to be met in adapting international competition policy regimes to the
needs ofLDCs.
2 The Interface Between Trade and Competition Policies
The overriding objective ofinternational trade policy during the past halfcentury, ifnot
longer, has been reducing barriers to the free flow ofgoods and services across national
boundaries. Much has been achieved. The most dramatic illustration of the
interdependence between trade policy and competition policy came with the formation of
the European Common Market through the 1957 Treaty ofRome. As tariffbarriers were
reduced, anti-dumping mechanisms were phased out beginning in 1970. But to ensure
that trade among Common Market member nations was not distorted, an active
competition policy was considered essential. As a member of the EC Commission
argued in the 1961 debate over proposed institutions to implement Community-wide
competition policies: 1
It is ... beyond dispute -- and the authors ofthe Treaty [ofRome] were fully aware
of this -- that it would be useless to bring down the trade barriers between the
member states ifthe governments or private industry were to remain free through
economic or fiscal legislation~ through subsidies or cartel-like restrictions on
competition, virtually to undo the opening ofthe markets and to prevent, orat least
unduly to delay, the action needed to adapt them to the Common Market.
I Speech by Hans von der Groeben, quoted in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Hearings, Antitrust Developments in the European
Common Market (USGPO: 1963), p. 96.Among the monopolistic practices singled out in .the Treaty of Rome as potentially
inc~nsistent with the attainment ofa true common market were inter-finn agreements and
concerted practices affecting trade between member states (prohibited, with certain
escape hatches, under Article 85) and the abuse ofdominant market positions (covered
by Article 86).
Monopolistic practices can distort international trade in a variety ofways. A main goal of
GATT rounds beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through the 1970s was the
reduction of trade-restricting import tariffs and quotas. But buyer cartels and vertical
restraints that make it difficult for foreign finns to secure distribution channels for their
exported goods have effects directly analogous to import tariffs and quotas. This is well
recognized but continues to be a source of trading mction -- e.g., between the United
States and Japan.2
Onthe other side ofthe tariffledger there is an intriguing asymmetry. When an exporting
nation supplies a sufficiently large share oftotal world output to influence the prevailing
price appreciably, the imposition ofan export tariff can alter the terms of trade in the
exporting nation's favor, facilitating the collection of monopoly rents. Using tariffs to
transfonn trade flows in this way appears to be rare, although exceptions exist.3 Much
rno~e common, partly because it falls outside the scope ofGAIT rules but also because
national governments are easily persuaded to let well-organized producer groups capture
monopoly rents from foreign customers, is the fonnation of export cartels and the
cultivation ofnational champion firms dominating export markets. Even in nations that
have tough laws against cartels operating within their national boundaries, export cartels
are typically exempted from the prohibitions. Thus, what is discouraged by trade policies
thrives under chauvinistic competition policies.
When monopolies and cartels are permitted for some reason to operate within a national
market, they often find it profitable to engage in price discrimination, among other things
selling their output at lower prices in more competitive export markets than in the home
market. Such dumping, ofcourse, is the traditional bugaboo ofinternational trade policy.
Nations whose home ingustries have been injured by dumping often respond by
2 On vertical restraints, see my paper, "Retail Distribution Channel Barriers to International
Trade," forthcoming in the proceedings of\a November 1995 Columbia University Law School
conference on The Multilateral Trade Regime in the 21st Century. On the trade-distorting role
ofbuyer cartels in the Japanese cement industry, see Mark Tilton, Restrained Trade: Cartels in
Japan's Basic Materials Industries (Cornell University Press: 1995), Chapter 4.
3 See e.g. Sowah Anyetei, "An Econometric Analysis ofMacroeconomic Policy in Ghana, 1956-
69," Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1980 (on cocoa bean taxes when Ghana was
the world's leading supplier); and Joseph P. Kalt, "The Political Economy of Protectionism:
Tariffs and Retaliation in the Timber Industry," in Robert E. Baldwin, ed., Trade Growth and
the Balance ofPayments (University ofChicago Press: 1988), pp. 339-368 (on lumber export
tariffs imposed by Canadato settle a trade dispute with the United States).
2negotiating with the exporting nations voluntaIy restraint agreements under which the
exporters consent to raise their prices or limit their exported output.4 To implement the
VRAs, the exporting finns must find some way to apportion overall export quotas and/or
to prevent the undercutting ofagreed-upon price floors - in other words, to form de facto
export cartels. Or alternatively, the government ofthe exporting nation must assume the
role of cartel manager. In either case, competition policy shortcomings lead to
international trade policy actions, which in tum trigger further departures from the
behavioral patterns competition policy supposedly encourages.
When a single finn has sufficient monopoly power to engage in systematic price
discrimination across diverse nations, it has incentives to preclude the exportation (or re-
exportation) of its products from low-price to high-price jurisdictions and hence to
prevent arbitrage from enforcing the law ofone price. Restrictive agreements confining
distributors and dealers to assigned territories and preventing sales outside those
tenitories can be used to enforce discriminatory market segmentation. In its efforts to
perfec! the Common Market, the European Community Commission has wielded its
competition laws aggressively against such trade-distorting vertical restraints.s
3 The Spread ofCompetition Policies
Implementing aggressive policies to combat monopolistic structures and behavior was
once a near-monopoly ofthe United States. Before World Warn, most nations treated.'
monopolies and cartels, domestic and international, with benign neglect, or e.g. in
Germany and Japan, actively encouraged them.6 In the years following World Warn, a
few nations enacted competition laws for the first time or, when weak laws already
existed, strengthened them. The adoption ofpro-competition policies then spread at an
accelerating pace. Among the 24 nations belonging to the GECD in 1992, only three had
by that time no pro-competition laws. The dismantling ofthe Iron Curtain precipitated a
new fl~ofenactments in former members ofthe Soviet bloc.' The Asian tigers and a
4 On the European experience, see Patrick A. Messerlin, "The EC Antidumping Regulations: A
First Economic Appraisal," Weltwirt-schaftliches Archiv, vol. 125 (1989), pp. 563-587.
S A precedent-setting decision in the 1964 Grundig-Consten case prohibited restraints on the re-
export of electronic equipplent by Grundig's distributors in France. An important recent case
involved Bayer's calcium-channel blocker drug Adalat (called Procardia in the United States).
See the Commission Decision in re Adalat, Case IV/34.2791F3 (1995).
6 For an historical review ofpolicies in several leading nations, see F. M. Scherer, Competition
Policies for an Integrated World Economy (Brookings Institution: 1994), Chapter 3.
, See e.g. Saul Estrin and Martin Cave, eds., Competition and Competition Policy: A Comparative
Analysis ofEastern and Central Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); and Paul L. Joskow, Richard
Schmalenseer and Natalia Tsukanova, "Competition Policy in. Russia during and after
Privatization," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics (1994, pp. 301-381.
3considerable nwnber of less':'developed nations such as India, Colwnbia, Mexico, and
Kenya have also passed competition laws. The various national laws differ enonnously
in their emphasis, exempted practices, and the enthusiasm with which they have been
enforced.8 If the historical experiences of the United States, the United Kingdom,
Gennany, Japan, and the European Community are any guide, at least a decade must pass
between the enactment of such laws and the time when serious, tough enforcement
begins.
Excepting the European Common Market and a more limited bilateral harmonization
between Australia and New Zealand, attempts to adopt multilateral competition policies
spanning national borders have met with little success.9 ' From the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana during 1947 and 1948, a draft treaty
called the Havana Charter emerged. It proposed the creation ofan International Trade
Organization with responsibilities inter alia for implementing Havana Charter Article 45,
which stated: 10
Each Member shall take appropriate measures and shall cooperate with the [ITO]
to prevent, on the part of private or commercial enterprises, business practices
affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or
foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the
expansion ofproduction or trade ...
The Havana Charter was not ratified, in no small measure because strong concern was
voiced in the United States Senate that it would infringe too deeply on U.S. sovereignty.
From the original Charter draft were extracted sections dealing with dwnping and
international trade-distorting subsidies, which became the basis ofGATT in 1948.
An ambitious international convention onrestrictive practices was endorsed bythe United
Nations Economic and Social Council in 1953 and ratified by seven nations before a U.S.
decision not to ratify administered the coup de grace. Subsequent attempts by the United
Nations and the OECD to secure acceptance ofproposed multilateral competition codes
have been equally unsuccessful. However, proposals (including my ownll) for the
8 For OECD members, changes in law and important enforcement actions are tracked in periodic
reports typically titled Competition Policy 'in OECD Countries (with covered years appended).
No systematic compendium of the laws in less-developed nations appears to exist, although
articles on specific nations' policies can be found in the numerous specialized journals treating
competition policy issues.
9 The material in this paragraph and the next is drawn from Scherer, Competition Policies for an
Integrated World Economy, pp. 38-39.
10 U.S. Department of State, Havana Charter for an Inter-national Trade Organization (March
1948), pp. 4-5.
11 Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy, Chapter 5.
4harmonization ofcompetition policies toward international transactions and the creation
ofenforcement mechanisms continue to be advanced. Most emphasize curbing export
cartels and other border-spanning cartels with a direct impact on international trade. The
renewed interest in multilateral measures is attributable in part to perceptions that the
proliferation of national policies and the success of the Uruguay Rmmd render
competition policy hannonization both more feasible and more necessary.
4 The Special Needs ofLess-Developed Nations
Less-developed nations have been slower than their already industrialized counterparts to
enact laws seeking to maintain vigorous competition in their domestic markets. The
arguments for and against pro-competitive policies within home markets overlap to some
extent the considerations affecting LDCs' willingness to embrace international
competition policies, which will be my main focus in what follows. It is nonetheless
useful to identify at the outset some sources ofinternal tension. One can scarcely address
the issues objectively without being the kind oftwo-anned economist at whom President
HallyTruman once complained.
On one hand, because purchasing power is low, markets for many non-staple goods and
services are characteristically thin in most less-developed nations. To achieve low-cost
domestic production despite weak demand, a high degree ofseller concentration, perhaps
borderingon monopoly, may be necessary in industries subject to appreciable economies
of scale. Even in highly industrialized nations, the fear that scale economies might be
sacrificed has often kept strong anti-merger and monopoly divestiture provisions out of
competition policy laws. In Sweden during 1967; for example, domestic demand was
insufficient to support even a single plant ofminimum efficient scale in three ofthe twelve
industries (beer brewing, cigarettes, and refrigerators) on which I conducted a detailed
inquiry. In four other industries (paints, glass bottles, steel, and storage batteries), the
market could accommodate only one or two plants of efficient scale~ 12 If efficient
domestic production in such high-scale industries (and many others) is to be sustained,
monopolistic market structure can scarcely be avoided.
On the other hand, if domestic producers are allowed to enjoy the fiuits of a highly
concentrated market structure by pursuing monopolistic pricing policies, resource
allocation may be distorted, income distribution will be skewed, and perhaps most
importantly, entrepreneurs may opt for a "quiet life" from which tight cost controls and
vigorous innovation are absent. There is much to be said for bringing to bear upon
concentrated domestic industries as much competitive pressure as is consistent with the
realization ofscale economies. One way to do so is to insist that when there is room for
more than one producer in a given industry, the market participants be enjoined from
12 F. M. Scherer, Alan Beckenstein; Erich Kaufer, and R. Dennis Murphy, The Economics of
Multi-Plant Operation: An International Comparisons Study (Harvard University Press:. 1975),
·p.94. .'..
5fonning cartels, fonnal orinfonnal, to suppress competition among themselves. Mergers
among competingproducers might also be prevented unless the would-be mergerpartners
present compelling evidence that their integration will yield significant economies.13
Thus, tough pro-competition policies can help cultivate efficient domestic enterprises.14
The other way to do so is to keep import baniers as low as possible, forcing the small
number -of domestic producers to compete against efficient foreign suppliers. A
necessary concomitant may be preventing domestic firms from collaborating in
international cartels. One possible consequence may be the demise of domestic
enterprises unfit for the competitive struggle, in which case severe conflicts between
competition policy and industrialization goals may be faced. To these I return in a later
section.
5 Commodity Cartels
For many less-developed countries, the export of primary agricultural or mineral
commodities is the principal source of earnings from international trade. How such
primary commodity trade would be treated under an international competition policy
agreement would be of great concern. It is reasonable to believe that the leading oil-
exporting nations would refuse to ratify a competition policy accordifthey were deprived
ofthe ability to participate in OPEC, however poorly adhered OPEC's price and quota
agreements have been in recent years. Similar opt-out decisions could expected from
Malaysia if it could not participate in a tin cartel, Jamaica to maintain bauxite cartel
possibilities, Brazil to preserve coffee cartel arrangements, Ghana to maintain a cocoa
bean cartel, Russia and South Africa to cooperate with the De Beers syndicate, and
perhaps even Canadato maintain the possibility ofuranium and potash cartels.
Accepting- the premise that primary commodities were somehow different, the draft
Havana Charter treaty included provisions to exempt from its main anti-cartel thrust
intergovernmental agreements to set and stabilize the prices of primary commodities,
defined as "any product of farm, forest, or fishery or any mineral" in its natural or
13 Interpreting such evidence is often difficult. See F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial
Market Structure and Economic Performance' (3rd ed.; Houghton-Mifflin, 1990), pp. 186-188;
and, on an early test of the U.S. Department of Justice merger efficiencies defense, F. M.
Scherer, "Archer-Daniels-Midland and Clinton Com Processing," John F. Kennedy School of
Government case study CI6-92-1126.0, Harvard University, 1992.
14 This is an implication drawn inter alia from comparative research by Michael Porter, The
Competitive Advantage ofNations (Free Press: 1990), pp. 117-124, 594-598, and 662-673; and
Martin Baily and Hans Gersbach, "Efficiency in Manufacturing and the Nature ofCompetition,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics (1995), pp. 307-358.
6preliminarily processed form. IS Such agreements would·be authorized only when the
International Trade Organization concludedthat16
(a) a burdensome surplus ... has developed or is expected to develop, which ...
would cause serious hardship to producers among whom are small producers
who account for a substantial portion of the total output, and that these
conditions could not be corrected by normal market forces in time to prevent
such hardship, because, characteristically ... a substantial reduction in price does
not readily lead to a significant increase in consumption or to a significant
decrease in production; or
(b) widespread unemployment or under-employment has developed or is expected
to develop, which, in the absence ofspecific governmental action, would not be
corrected by normal market forces in time to prevent widespread and undue
hardship to workers.
A simil~ primary commodity exemption was proposed in Edward Mason's 1946 book,
which anticipated and probably influenced the Havana Charter, because "output responds
slowly to increased prices, but once expanded it is extremely difficult to contract,"
because resources are immobile, because workers' income depends directly upon prices,
and because a large number ofworkers are employed. 17
During the ensuing halfcentwy most economists have.become skeptical ofthe argument
that cartels have desirable market-stabiJ.iziDg properties. It is far from clear that
maintaining high prices stabilizes employment. And because cartels tend to collapse
owing to buffer stock overhangs, chiseling, and induced new entry when'output is
severely restricted to sustain high prices, their ebl? and fall actually adds to the longer-
term instability ofworld markets. OPEC's massive price-raising in 1973-74 and the late
1970s contributed materially to the world-wide recessions of 1975 and the early 1980s
and ultimately sowed the seeds ofOPEC's subsequent ineffectiveness.
Several recent studies have implied that LDCs may be ill-advised in relying too heavily
upon primary commodities as a foundation for economic growth, since the growth rate of
real gross domestic product appears to be negatively correlated with the extent ofreliance
IS U.S. Department ofState, Havana Charter, p. 92.
16 Ibid., p. 97.
17 Edward S. Mason, Controlling World Trade: Cartels and Commodity Agreements (McGraw-
Hill, 1946), pp. 36-37 and 141-142. Mason was the founder ofthe Harvard school ofindustrial
organ-ization economics.
7upon primary commodity exports.18 However valid that warning may be, its caveat does
not carry. over to participation in primary commodity cartels, given a nation's reliance
upon such commodity exports. The gross domestic product variable used to measure
growth in those studies underestimates the attractiveness of (successful) commodity
cartels in three ways. Real exports, which add to GDP, are presumably measured by
deflating export shipments measured in monetary terms by an export price index. The
more successful a nation is in raising its export commodity price, the more the measured
GDP contribution ofexports will diminish, ceteris paribus. Indeed, ifthe quantity ofthe
commodity exported by a nation is restricted to raise export income, a correct accounting
will show the cartelized export sector to be a drag on GDP. Second., the increased
revenues from successful cartelization may be spent at least in part on increasing
substantially the importation of goods and services that enhance consumers' living
standards, but whose increase reduces measured GDP. Third, some ofthe revenue from
cartelization may beinvested abroad, earning rents that are subtracted from gross national
product estimated to derive gross domestic product.
,.,'
Thus, when less-developed nations believe that cartelization of primary commodity
exports will be successful under at least some circumstances, they will be reluctant to
ratify a multilateral competition policy treaty that prohibits all cartels in international
..tt~~~ .. In my proposal for an international competition policy accord, I have dealt with
this .likelihood by allowing each signatory nation to exempt from the export cartel
prohibition tlrree ~~!lstries, each defined no more broadly than a single four-digit SITC
category.19 ~.exper1en.c~ is, g~~d with the new policy and international trade becomes
increasingly free from cartel di~;tortions, the exemption could be reduced progressively to
two industries, then one,.an4 'ip.,some distant future nirvana, to zero. The proposal to
exempt a fixed number,.of industries was deliberately biased in favor of LDCs, whose
exports are likely to be concentrated over a narrower array of industry categories than
those oHlighly industrialized nations.
6 '., Co~'petition PoJi~y and Industrialization
" . ~'~.;;\ .......
We advance. no~ ..t9; ,"¥~:. question of how the efforts of LDCs to build industrial
capabilities would be affected by a multilateral treaty extending pro-competitive rules
more or less comprehens-ively to international trade, Such rules would operate on two
relevant fronts: they would constrain the activities of firms at home in industrialized
..nations from whom LDCs buy 'and to whom they sell~ and they would constrain the
exporting and buying activities ofenterprises at home within LDCs.
18 See e.g. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth," Working Paper 5398, National Bureau ofEconomic Research, December 1995, and
the other studies cited there.
19 Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy, p, 93.
86.1 CartelActivity by Firms Based in Industrialized Nations
To the extent that the development ofLDC industries depends upon the importation of
raw materials, intennediate components (such as semiconductors), and capital goods
from industrialized nations, curbing the restrictive practices ofenterprises supplying those
inputs would be beneficial. Howlarge the benefits would be is difficult tojudge.
During the, 1920s and 1930s, multinational enterprises commonly agreed among
themselves upon spheres ofinfluence, designating specific customer nations or broader
geographic areas such as South America or Southeast Asia as the exclusive market ofa
single enterprise.20 In other instances, they colluded in setting prices, especially on sales
in less-developed nations. Monopolistic restrictions were effected in third-party nations
for such diverse products as basic chemicals, explosives, and dyestuffs; synthetic fibers
and plastics, aspirin,21 light bulbs, and heavy electrical equipment. Many ofthose cartel
arrangements crumbled during the late 1930s when the United States began wielding its
antitrust laws aggressively to challenge participation in them by American companies.
Since the U.S. firms were key players, their abstention made it difficult for enterprises
from more pennissive national jurisdictions to sustain their collusion. There is evidence,
however, at least for heavy electrical equipment, that cartelized price-raising continued
after World War II in markets outside the United States, Japan, Western Europe, and the
socialist bloc - in other words, in an array ofless-developed countries.22 The extent to
which such activities persist in secrecy today is unknown. It is almost certain that.the·
volume of LDC equipment purchases affected is closer to zero than to the levels
prevailing during the 1930s.
Most nations, it has been observed earlier, exempt export cartels fonned among domestic
producers from their competition policy prohibitions. Somewhat more is known about
these fonnally exempted cartels, which must typically be registered with national
authorities, than about sub-rosa cartels, which have probably been driven deep
underground by the aggressive enforcement of national and EC competition policies.
Intensified international competition has undoubtedly limited their impact. During the
1930s, export "associations" fonned under the U.S. Webb-Pomerene law originated
approximately 19 percent ofU.S. exports.23 By 1981, the number of Webb-Pomerene
20 See e.g. George W, Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action: Case Studies in
International Business Diplomacy (Twentieth Century Fund: 1946).
21 See Charles C. Mann and Mark L. Plummer, The Aspirin Wars (Harvard Business School Press:
1991), especially Chapters 4-6.
22 See U.S. House ofRepresentatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report,
International Electrical Association: A Continuing Cartel (USGPO: June 1980).
23 For the sources of. statistics cited in this paragraph, see Scherer, 'Competition 'Policies for an "
Integrated World Economy, p. 46.
9associations had dwindled to 39, accOlUlting for less than two.percent ofU.S. exports. In
West Gennany during the 1980s, 60 export cartels alleged not to have effects in the
domestic market and:four conceding domestic effects originated an estimated two percent
ofGennan eXports. Roughly half ofthe Japanese export cartels registered in the early
1980s operated ,in the textile industry, which is sufficiently competitively structured
internationally that 'apim~ciable price-raising consequences would not be anticipated.
Canada maintains a cartel for the export (to markets other than the United States) of
potash, an important fertilizer ingredient on which Canada's world market position is
analogous to that of OPEC. To what degree competition from Gennan, Russian,
Ukrainian, Belarusan, and Israeli suppliers constrains its pricing is not known.
Cartelization could affect not only the supply of equipment and raw materials to less-
developed nations, but also the supply oflicensed technology. Many ofthe international
cartels that thrived during the 1920s and 1930s were based upon patent and know-how
cross-licenses among a few world market-dominating companies. These technology pools
were for the most part broken up as a result of U.S. antitrust enforcement efforts.
Whether technology is currently denied to LDC producers as a result of collusion is
unknown, at least to this author. Alice Amsden reports that after Korea's Pohang Iron
and Steel Company emerged as one ofthe world's most efficient producers by licensing
Japanese. technology, "Japanese steel makers [became] increasingly reluctant to transfer
know-how to their erstwhile student."24 Similar difficulties were reported as Korean
qompanies moved to the frontier ofintegrated circuit manufacturing. In both cases, it
s~'el11~ clear, the Korean enterprises were able to circumvent the reluctance of some
sources to supply technology by turnip.g to other sources. Lenin may have been correct
when'he quipped that capitalists will sell the rope with which they are hanged.2s
Especially in high-technology industries, individual firms may derive from patent rights
and other first-mover advantages substantial monopoly power unlikely to be brought
within the reach ofany feasible international competition policy code. Intel's practices in
the sal'e ofits market-dominating IBM-compatible microprocessors provide an example.26
24 Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korean and Late Industrialization (Oxford
University Press: 1989), p. 309.
2S Technology licensing practices are the ol).ly domain in which the Marrakech Treaty authorizes
competition policy actions by one nation against the enterprises ofanother nation. Article 40 of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights states that "some
licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain
competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the dissemination of
technology." It mentions as non-exhaustive examples exclusive grantback conditions, conditions
preventing challenges to a patent's validity, and coercive package licensing. It does not explicitly
cite refusals to license as a practice against which competition policy measures may be taken.
26 The author was a consultant to Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., on U.S. and Taiwanese antitrust
charges resulting from the practices described here. See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., v. Iritel
Corporation, case no. C-91-20541JW, first amended complaint, March 8, 1994 (U.S. Federal
10Intel attempted (in the end, unsuccessfully) to collect- from Taiwanese computer
assemblers a one percent patent royalty on their sales ofcomputers embodying non-Intel
microprocessors with Windows-compatible multitasking capabilities. Another strategy
proved to be more resilient. Computer assemblers (Compaq excepted) both inthe United
States and East Asia who used competitive microprocessors in their computers were
denied allocations of the newest and most powerful chips. This policy inhibited the
computer makers' ability to design the most up-to-date computer models. Intel thereby
made it difficult for competitive microprocessor makers to gain substantial sales even
when they quoted prices below Intel's, which retarded their progress down learning
curves and their ability to realize profits developing new chips. Taiwanese assemblers,
most ofwhom lacked substantial brand-name recognition, were in turn inhibited in their
attempts t6 embrace a possibly important cost advantage..
International competition policy codes reducing non-tariff baniers to maket access in
prosperous nations could increase the export sales potential ofless-developed countries'
industrial enterprises in two main ways -- by curbing buyer cartels and by easing the
restrictions resulting from incumbent manufacturers' control of distribution channels.
That Japanese portland cement manufacturers have used their links with cartelized ready-
mixed concrete and construction companies to restrain imports ofTaiwanese and Korean
cement has been documented by Tilton.27 Most inter-national competition policy
proposals,would attack such buyer cartels along with sellers' export cartels. The control
by incumbent manufacturers of difficult-to-replicate distribution channels poses more
difficult problems. Allegations ofimport restraint through exclusive dealing relationships
between Japanese manufacturers and their wholesalers and retailers have been the focus
of particularly nettlesome disputes between the United States and Japan.28 If U.S.
merchandise has difficulty reaching Japanese retailers' shelves because ofsuch practices,
one might expect would-be exporters from less-developed nations to be at least equally
disadvantaged. The difficulty is, there are often good efficiency-based groWlds for
exclusive dealing arrangements. Consequently, despite its generally tough antitrust
policies, the United States treats "vertical restraints" within its domestic markets under a
relatively permissive rule-of-reason standard. Writing more stringent standards into a
multilateral competition policy code therefore seems improbable.
I conclude this survey by conceding that far too little is known about the benefits that
might flow to newly-emerging LDC industries through the application of multilateral
competition codes to industrialized nations' enterprises. Economic research by both
government agencies and scholars on the scope and consequences ofrestrictive practices
District Court for the Northern District ofCalifornia); and "Intel Lawyer Commands Chip War,"
San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1993.
27 Tilton, Restrained Trade, pp. 89-111.
28 See Scherer, "Retail Distribution Channel Barriers to International Trade."
11in world trade has fallen from fashion. Systematic research pooling the insights of
knowledgeable industrialists, government officials, and scholars could provide the basis
for better-infonnedjudgments.
6.2 Cartels and Monopoly Among LDC Enterprises
Tough international competition codes would bite against the restnctlve practices
deployed byenterprises at home in LDCs as well as those from the industrialized nations.
Would the consequence be the retardation or acceleration of LDCs' economic
development?
Making the leap to modem products and production processes is not easy. Technology
must be absorbed from abroad, ,and until a considerable amount oflearning-by-doing has
occurred, unit costs may (despite low wages) be higher than the prices at which
comparable products are available from industrialized nations. During these early stages
of production, it may be necessary to shield LDC firms from foreign competition.
Advocating protective-tariffs in the United States for precisely those reasons, the first
U.S. Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, acknowledged in 1791 :29
There remains to be noticed an objection to the encour-agement ofmanufactures,
ofa nature different from those which question the probability ofsuccess. This is
derived from its supposed tendency to give a monopoly ... to particular classes at
the expense ofthe rest ofthe community, who, it is affinned, would be able to
procure the requisite supplies of manufactured articles on better tenns from
I foreigners, than from our own Citizens ...
It is not an unreasonable supposition, that measures, which serve to abridge the
free competition offoreign Articles, have a tendency to occasion an enhancement
ofprices and it is not to be denied that such is the effect in a number ofCases....
[But] the contrary is the ultimate effect with every successful manufacture. When
a domestic manufacture has attained to perfection, and has engaged in the
prosecution ofit a competent number ofPersons, it invariably becomes cheaper....
The internal competition, which takes place, soon does away every thing like
Monopoly, and by degrees reduces the price ofthe Article to the minimum ofa
reasonable profit onthe Capital employed.
;' Pursuing such "infant industry" policies,' rapidly-developing nations such as Japan,
'Taiwan, and South Korea have protected new industries behind relatively high tariffs until
the producers are able to hold their own in international competition. Reducing such
t¥iffs, often gradually, has been the task of the various early GATT rounds. But in
~ddition, as one component oftheir export-led growth poli~ies, Japan and South Korea in
29 ~exan_der Hamilton, "Rep<?rt on the. Subject ofManufact-ures," in Harold C. Syrett, ed., ,The
'Paper;"ofAlexander Hamilton, vol. io (Co')umbia University Press: 1966), pp. 285-286.
12particular have frequently accompanied tariffprotection with pennissive policies toward
cartel fonnation and in some cases the support ofmonopoly positions in home markets.
There are three main rationales for such monopoly-friendly policies. As noted earlier,
economies ofscale may require high concentrationofproduction within the home market.
Second, concentrated, coordinated marketing might be more effective in conquering
export markets than dispersed, scatter-shot efforts. They may also ensure that money is
not "left on the table," i.e., that export prices are no lower than they need to be to meet
competition in foreign markets. And third, the high prices and (less certainly) profits that
can be gained through monopoly or cartelization at home can help subsidize the high
costs oftechnology absorptioll; learning-by-doing, and product development that must be
incurred if export markets are to be won. Each of these rationales merits fuller
exploration.
First, however, an obvious point must be addressed. Holding prices at monopolistic
level~ in the domestic market while aggressively competing for orders in export markets
is likely to be construed as dwnping under either traditional Vinerian (net export prices
less than home price) or newer constructed value (net export price less than average cost)
criteria. If the penetration of export markets is sufficient to cause ma~eri~.' injury,
conventionally defined, to target market producers, either of two reactions - one
potentially favorable from the LDC's perspective, one less so - can ensue.
The more favorable reaction is for the target nation's goverinnent'to impose trigger prices
or import quotas, requiring the exporting LDC to sell a smaller quantity at higher prices.
As we have seen earlier, to achieve this, de facto cartelization ofthe exporting nation's
industry, sometimes with the government acting as cartel master through quota ....
assigmnents and monitoring, on other occasions through intra-industry coordination, must ..
occur. Reconciling such trade-policy-induced cartelization with.the prevailing nonns of
international competition policy poses difficult problems. Presumabiy, th~re would have
to be "act ofstate" exceptions to the general preswnption against export cartels.
The less favorable reaction is for the target nation to impose dwnping duties on the
exporting nation's shipments. Ifhigh costs are being absorbed through monopolistically
high prices at home in order to subsidize exports, the imposition of dumping duties,
combined with the prohibition offurther sales at dumping prices, is likely to render the
continuation ofexports unprofitable, thwarting the LDC's export-led growth policy.
One way for the LDC seeking export-led growth to escape the second ofthese fates is to
cartelize its export activities so that its industries' export prices undercut the prices
prevailing in target markets minimally, causing no more than acceptable injury to target
market producers. Japan's MITI apparently tried to thread the needle in this way when it
orchestrated an export cartel among television producers (also cartelized at home), whose
share ofcolor TV set sales in the U.S. market soared to 36 percent by 1976. However,
the Japanese producer~ chiseled on their agreement, undercutting MITI-authorized
"check" prices intended to avert dumping charges. The ensuing dumping actions failed,
wibliothek d86lnstituts
13 fur We!twirtschaft Ki~however, because of gaps in U.S. trade law (closed through 1974 amendments). U.S.
television makers thereupon sued their Japanese counterparts, alleging Shennan Act
antitrust violations through cartelized predation upon the u.S. industry. Applying newly-
defined criteria for detemrining whether prices were predatory (rather than the less
tolerant <;riteria governing dumping disputes), the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the Japanese TVmakers' actions were not demonstrably predatory.30 Thus, despite heavy
litigation costs, the Japanese cartel strategy might be said to have succeeded.
It is unlikely that a similar strategy could succeed ifthere were internationally accepted
rules against the cartelization ofexport activities, which would surely be the first priority
ofa multilateral competition policy code. But such a pact might open up a second avenue
permitting LDC producers to charge high monopolistic prices at home, subsidizing lower
prices in export markets, and still escape anti-dumping actions. If, as in the European
Common Market, the rules ofcompetition policy were to replace traditional anti-dumping
rules in adjudicating trade disputes, producers in LDCs (and elsewhere) would enjoy
much more leeway in pricing their exports.31 A price less than the (monopolistic) home
market price would not be construed automatically as a dumping price. And, in place of
the constructed value rule -- net export prices may not exceed average total cost plus a
normal profit margin -- the competition policy rule might permit export prices, consistent
with rational price discrimination, to fall all the way to marginal cost.32 Such a change
would greatly facilitate the pursuit of export-led growt4 strategies by less-developed
nations.33
30 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. et al. v. Zenith Radio Corp. et aI., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
For an extended criticism of the Supreme Court's reasoning, see David Schwartzman, The
Japanese Television Cartel (University ofMichigan Press: 1993).
31 This point is also made by Robert Z. Lawrence in "Competition Policies and the Developing
Countries," working paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July
1995.
32 Although the marginal cost rule has been applied most frequently in U.S. antitrust cases during
the past two decades, there is continuing debate over its merits. See e.g. James D. Hurwitz and
William Kovacic, "Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends," Vanderbilt Law
Review, vol. 35 (January 1982), pp,. 63-157; Kenneth Elzinga and David E. Mills, "Trumping the
Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoupment Standard in Brooke Group," Antitrust Law Journal, vol.
62 (Spring 1994), pp. 559-584; and Jonathan B. Baker, "Predatory Pricing after Brooke Group:
An Economic Perspective," Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 62 (Spring 1994), pp. 585-603.
~~ However, their adoption by nations as large as China and India is more problematic. Prime
export target nations such as the United States almost surely have thresholds beyond which
further, or more rapid, increases in modem manufactured goods imports will not be tolerated,
and barriers under a Section 201 "escape clause" rationale will be imposed. Because Japan was
the first major nation to pursue an export-led growth strategy, it reached critical thresholds only
slowly. Because the Asian tigers were small, they too enjoyed a considerable grace period. But
because imports have already reached substantial levels and because nations such as China and
14Cartels among LDC manufacturers could facilitate export-led modernization drives in
other ways. When plant-specific scale economies are important and least-cost plant
capacity increments come in large hnnps, tradeoffs may be faced.34 Ifthe LDC's industry
contains several producers, each finn may fear that ifall invest at the same time, the
added output will drive export prices to unprofitable levels (or below dumping
thresholds). Alternatively, eachmay be saddled with considerable costly excess capacity.
As a result, each may choose to invest in smaller increments, sacrificing scale economies
to avoid spoiling markets. Japan's MITI avoided this problem when steel producers were
expanding rapidly during the 1960s by orchestrating a capacity expansion cartel.35 MITI
designated each company to build a big new blast furnace and ancillary steel-making
facilities on a rotating basis, with the rotation timed to permit orderly market absorption
ofoutput lumps. When plant-specific scale economies are modest but strong product-
specific economies exist, least-cost production may be facilitated through specialization
cartels. Inthe Japanese ball and roller bearing industry, for example, each company was
assigned by MITI to specialize in certain clusters ofbearings whose potential production
volumes were too small to permit efficient fabrication by more than one finn. For high-
vofUme bearings with markets considerably larger than the scale ofa single production
line, on the other hand, no such product assignment restrictions were imposed.
These cartel measUres probably contributed to the strong export market competitiveness
of Japane~e steel and anti-friction bearing producers. Their influence almost certainly
spilled over into the realm ofpricing.36 Whether such cartels would be permitted under
hannonized international competition policy rules is an important question. Many
national laws exempt "rationalization" and "specialization" cartels from the prohibitions
applied to price-fixing and related cartel behavior. Pressures to exclude them from a
multilateral accord are likely to be powerful. For less-developed nations pursuing export-
led growth (but not arguably for consumers in their home markets), exclusion would be
beneficial.
India are capable ofabsolutely large export surges in short periods, tolerance thresholds will be
exceeded much more quickly.
34 See Scherer et aI., The Economics ofMulti-Plant Operation, pp. 35-48,92-112: and 143-154.
3S South Korea dodged the problem by concentrating most ofits commercial steel production in a
single firm, Pohang Steel. On the government's denial ofconstruction permits sought by other
Chaebols, see Junki Kim, "State-Owned Enterprise Sector Reform and Privatization: Theory and
Some Evidence from Korea," Ph.D. disser-tation, Harvard University, 1996.
36 On the cartelized pricing ofJapanese steel makers, including measures used to exclude imports
oflower:-cost Korean steel, see Tilton, Managed Trad~, Chapter 6.
156.3 Domestic MarketStructure and Industrialization
Although export pricing policies embodying elements of collusion, dumping, or both,
would be affected, it is unlikely that international competition policy rules would have
much influence on the internal structure and conduct of emerging nations' industries.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to digress and consider a final question of considerable
importance - how choices between monopolistic vs. maximally competitive industry
structures might affect the speed at which LDCs' industries move to the frontiers of
modemtechnology.
The paramount task for LDCs in the early stages of indus-trialization is absorbing
technology already developed elsewhere in the world and implanting it finnly in local
product designs and production processes. To absorb others' technology effect-ively, it
must be recognized, it is essential to have a cadre of well-trained engineers, some of
whom carry out threshold amounts ofindependent technical activity (i.e., "R&D").37 But
what must mainly be achieved is what economists studying technological change call
"di:ffusion." There have been many empirical studies ofthe structural conditions within
which di:ffusion proceeds most swiftly.38 Several relevant findings emerge.
First, larger finns tend to adopt new technologies earlier than their smaller counterparts,
although it is less clear whether, once initial adoption occurs, the new methods are used
in a larger fraction ofall production activities bylarge finns than by small finns. Second,
the finn or plant size thresholds required for early adoption ofa new technology are often
modest. From a large survey ofU.S. producers, Kelley and Brooks found, for example,
that once finns employed 250 or more persons, the probability of having adopted
numerically- orcomputer-controlledmachine tools in 1987 reached 0.80.39 Third, there is
conflicting evidence on whether di:ffusion proceeds more rapidly when the technology-
adopting industry is highly concentrated (i.e., with few producers and/or a high
asymmetry offinn sizes) or more atomistically structured.40 Finally, although finn size
37 See Wesley M. Cohen and D. A. Levinthal, "Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces ofR&D,"
Economic Journal, vot. 99 (September 1989), pp. 569-596.
38 For a review ofthe literature, see Wiltiam L. Baldwin and John T. Scott, Market Structure and
Technological Change (Harwood Acad~mic Publishers: 1987), especially pp. 113-138.
39 Maryellen R. Kelley and Harvey Brooks, "Diffusion of NC and CNC Machine Tool
Technologies in Large and Small Firms," in R. U. Ayres et aI., eds., Computer Integrated
Manufacturing (London: Chapman & Hall, 199-), p. 118.
40 New U.S. studies on this issue include Timothy Hannan and John M. McDowell, "Market
Concentration and the Diffusion of New Technology in the Banking Industry," Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 66 (November 1984), pp. 686-691; and Sharon Levin, Stanford
Levin, and John Meisel; "A Dynamic Analysis ofthe Adoption ofa New Technology: The Case
ofOptical Scanners," Review ofEconomics and Statistics, vot. 69 (February 1987), pp. 12-17.
16and market structure matter, other organizational and sociological variables are at least as
important. Kelley and Brooks report that for quite small firms - i.e., those with fewer
than 20 employees - strong information networking links with machine suppliers, trade
associations, customers, and rival firms compensated for most of the diseconomies of
small size.41 This last generalizatiqn almost surely applies with equal force to technology
absOlption in less-developed countries. South Korea, with very large firms and tightly
oligopolistic industrial structures, and Taiwan, with many relatively small firms, have
both exhibited high proficiency in absorbing state-of-the-art technology across a wide
array of industries. Taiwan compensates for the size disadvantages of its industrial
structure by maintaining large, competent industrial technology institutes charged with
disseminating technology to domestic manufacturers.
Although exceptions exist (such as Indonesia's government-backed airliner development
venture), less-developed nations are unlikely to take the lead in developing
technologically advanced new products and processes. To the extentthat they attempt to
do so, c_ertain generalizations will be relevant. Most fimdamentally, there is a petvasive
duality in the structural requisites for rapid technological progress.42 On one hand,
vigorous rivalry stimulates industrial innovation -- at least, within limits. But onthe other
hand, iftoo many firms compete in a given innovative domain, the market each is able to
tap may become so fragmented and small that no firm will find investment in innovation
profitable, and so the market for innovations will fail. How many firms constitute "too
many" depends upon both demand and supply-side considerations. On the supply side,
the costs ofcarrying out new product R&D vary widely from product to product. The
distribution of required R&D outlays has its highest density at quite modest R&D
investments, but it has a long thin tail into the billion-dollar projects.43 Firms in newly-
industrializing nations would be well-advised to concentrate their efforts on developing
products for which the required R&D investments are modest. On the demand side, for a
given required R&D investment, the larger the relevant market is, the more firms there
can be vying to win a leading position through innovation without spoiling the prospects
for profit. The easing oftariff barriers and improvements in transportation have already
made it possible for would-be innovators at home in relatively small nations to see the
whole world as the market for their innovations. To the extent that harmonized
international competition policies reduce trade barriers incrementally, the market frontier
will be extended even more. In this respect too, less-developed nations could benefit -
although, given their compcu:ative disadvantage in high-level technical talent endowments,
the gain is likely to be small.'
41 Ibid., p. 125.
42 See Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, pp. 630-660;
and Baldwin and Scott, Market Structure and Technological Change, pp. 18-113.
43 See F. M. Scherer, "Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism," Journal ofEconomic Literature, vol.
30 (September 1992), p. 1428.
177 Conclusion
To sum up, extending competition policy rules to a world-wide trading arena is likely to
yield a mixed array ofbenefits and costs for less-developed countries. Most prominent
on the cost side wouldbe any flat prohibition ofthe commodity\.export cartels upon which
many LDCs relay for export earnings. To induce illCs' participation, some exceptions
to the general presumption against cartels would be necessary. Less-developed nations
would benefit most from an internationalization of competition policies if, as in the
European Common Market, predatory price standards replaced the dumping criteria
traditionally governing price discrimination in international trade. LDCs would also gain,
most likely only modestly, from expanded prohibitions against cartelization of raw
materials, component, capital goods, and technological know-how supplies among the
leading firms from industrialized nations and by tougher restrictions on import cartels and
distribution channel preclusion in important potential markets. Ifprogress is to be made
toward the harmonizationofinternational competition policies, the special needs ofLDCs
can surely be accommodated. This paper provides, I hope, a rough preliminary guide to
the issues thatwill be have to be addressed and some possible means ofresolvingthem.
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